ABSTRACT: The essays collected in this volume demonstrate that during the age of revolution (1760s-1840s) most sectors of the maritime industries experienced higher levels of unrest than is usually recognized. Ranging across global contexts including the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans as well as the Caribbean, Andaman, and South China Seas, and exploring the actions of sailors, laborers, convicts, and slaves, this collection offers a fresh, sea-centered way of seeing the
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Mutiny thus entered Europe's military vocabulary at a time when nascent nation-states began to transform their armies from chaotic collections of drifters, forced recruits, feudal retainers, and paid mercenaries into the standardized, tightly organized, and highly hierarchical warmaking machines of the modern era. As part of this military revolution, war-workers were deskilled and turned into replaceable cogs through a program of extensive drilling based on the time and motion studies carried out by the Dutch military pioneers Maurice and William Louis of Nassau, subsequently refined and implemented with deadly success by the legendary Swedish warrior-king Gustavus Adolphus. 2 in The Hague. The first conference was funded by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, the International Institute of Social History, the University of Pittsburgh, and Stichting Professor van Winterfonds. The second conference was funded by the University of Pittsburgh, the Huygens Institute for the History of the Netherlands, and Stichting Fonds voor de Geld-en Effectenhandel. We thank these institutions for their hospitality and generosity and the participants at both conferences for their comments on the papers. (Cambridge, 1996) , pp. 16-24. At sea, the process of military standardization lagged behind by a few decades, but as European powers expanded their professional war-fleets in the second half of the seventeenth century they imposed naval articles of war to create the same strictly hierarchical form of organization that had already transformed their armies. All traces of collective decision-making, long a prominent element of North Atlantic maritime culture, were obliterated. The result was a micro-society that resembled tyranny in its purest form: ''All that you are ordered to do is duty'', an old salt advised the landsman Ned Ward at the turn of the eighteenth century. ''All that you refuse to do'', he continued, ''is mutiny''. 3 The authoritarianism of the militarized work environment, which leaves no formal room for opposition short of all-out mutiny, explains in part why mutinous soldiers and sailors have repeatedly been in the most radically democratic, most militantly anti-imperialist vanguard of the great revolutionary movements that have thundered across the world in recent centuries: New Model Army mutineers at Putney in the midseventeenth century; sepoys at the start of the Indian Uprising in 1857; insurgent sailors at Kiel, which triggered the revolution that toppled the German Kaiser in 1918; seamen at Kronstadt who in 1921 challenged the increasingly authoritarian rule of the Bolsheviks; or, most recently, American GIs who, with their mass refusals, marches, protests, and anti-officer violence (''fragging''), undermined the war effort in Vietnam during the late 1960s and early 1970s. 4 Until recently, the scarcity of reliable data has made it seem nearly impossible to estimate the actual incidence of mutiny during the age of sail. The events themselves are notoriously underreported, shrouded in ''a double conspiracy of silence'' since no one involved had an interest in their involvement becoming known -for officers it might result in a career-ending stigma, for the mutineers themselves in a life-ending sentence. 5 As a consequence we must assume that extant evidence represents only a small proportion of actual events. And yet, where quantifiable data has been uncovered and analyzed, the results have been perfectly astonishing. New work has revealed previously unknown The essays collected here build on such work, demonstrating unambiguously that during the age of revolution (1760s-1840s) most sectors of the maritime industries -not just warships, but convict vessels, slave ships, and merchantmen, sailing in the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans as well as the Caribbean, Andaman, and South China Seas -all experienced far higher levels of unrest than is usually recognized. The authors range across global contexts: exploring the actions of sailors, laborers, convicts, and slaves, and offering a fresh, sea-centered way of seeing the confluence between space, agency, and political economy during this crucial period. They make clear that we must take seriously seaborne voyages as spaces for incubation and as vectors for diffusion of political radicalism.
In this respect, the volume uses evidence of shipboard mutiny to rethink the relationship between sea and land, as well as to foreground the era's multiple geographical centers and logics of resistance from below. We contend, in other words, that the radicalism of the age of revolution can best be viewed as a geographically connected process, and that the maritime world was central to its multiple eruptions and global character. And, in understanding the global and connected character of the age of revolution, as well as its maritime and subaltern dynamics, we seek to decenter Europe and North America in our analysis and also to rethink the era's temporality, which, these essays suggest, stretches at least into the 1850s.
M A R I T I M E R A D I C A L I S M
Mutiny is part of something bigger and broader, what we have chosen to call maritime radicalism, a term as well as a concept that has had virtually no presence in the literature on the revolutionary era until now. But why is that so, given the near universal recognition of the ship as the most important tool of globalization before the emergence of air travel in the twentieth century? Why have events and processes that transpired onboard ship remained hidden for so long? And why has it been so hard to conceptualize maritime radicalism as a subject for historical study?
Part of the problem has been sources. Seafarers, like other poor people of the past, left relatively few records of their own: their speeches, songs, and yarns vanished on the wind, leaving few traces for historians to ponder. Because they traveled far and wide, whatever sources they may have left are often widely dispersed and not easy to locate; their ''archive'' is not conveniently national, and rarely if ever self-generated. Historians must therefore depend to a large extent on sources about dissident sailors and other workers generated by the authorities of the state, often as they sought to repress maritime radicalism of one kind or another. The difficulty of recovering the voices below deck through the writings of those who wielded power over their heads is greater still when insurgents and authorities spoke different languages, as was often the case with slaves, colonial subjects, labor migrants, and foreign-born sailors, such as lascars.
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There is also the problem of ''terracentrism'', the pervasive unconscious assumption or belief that history is made exclusively on land. Most scholars, like everyone else, see the oceans of the world as anti-spaces, as blanks that lie in between, and which are somehow unreal in comparison to the landed, national spaces that surround them. If maritime space is, to a considerable extent, ''unthinkable'', it therefore follows that radical action taken at sea would be rendered invisible. 10 In Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea and The Many-HeadedHydra, Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker argued that within the Anglo-Afro-Hiberno Atlantic a coherent and effective maritime radicalism was embodied in a series of fugitive connections, over vast spaces and spans of time, based on the circulation of seafaring peoples and their experiences.
11 Its common characteristics included mobility and multiethnicity, both expressed in a potent phrase, the ''motley crew''. The guiding values and core practices of maritime radicalism were collectivism, anti-authoritarianism, and egalitarianism. Radical sailors routinely stood together (''one and all'' was a favorite cry), elected their officers, and divided their resources equally. All of these values and practices were eloquently expressed through the ''round robin'', an instrument of protest used by sailors, who drew one circle within another, wrote their demands within the interior circle, and signed their names from the edge of the inner circle to the outer one, to disguise who had begun the petition, to take strength in numbers, and to limit the captain's violent power of retaliation.
As we shall see in the essays that follow, the elements of maritime radicalism were many, ranging from the individual and solitary to the collective and massive. Sailors ran away, alone and in groups -sometimes big groups. When they remained on their vessels they engaged in a variety of acts of resistance. They challenged their captains and other officers through what was called ''sea-lawyering'': they grumbled or ''murmured'', indicating displeasure in indirect ways. They devised and signed petitions such as the round robin. They disputed orders, maintaining that law or custom underwrote their refusal to do as commanded by their officers. Negotiations subtle or overt were commonplace at sea. More dramatic forms of maritime radicalism included machine-breaking (sabotage), work stoppage, strike, running amok, as well as mutiny.
Sailors also carried maritime radicalism ashore, where they engaged in a variety of actions ranging from sabotage to arson to strikes: the sailors of London organized a massive work stoppage in 1768, first damaging the rigging of their ships in acts of sabotage, then ''striking'' the sails, forcing commerce to a halt, and thus adding the word strike to the English language.
12 Seafaring people were also frequent and enthusiastic leaders and participants in port city mobs (against impressment, among other causes), igniting riots and larger insurrections. Seafarers, dockworkers, and maritime artisans played important roles in revolutions -in America, France, and Saint-Domingue. The first and third of these world-shaking events contained an anti-imperial dimension, demonstrating the part seamen and their many-sided radicalism might play in peoples' war.
In this volume maritime radicalism consists of the ensemble of actions that challenged prevailing relations of power, at sea and ashore, on three interrelated levels: first, the ship itself, which was its own social and political unit; second, the nation-state or empire that formulated and enforced the laws that governed the ship; third, the system of international capitalism within which nation-states, empires, and their ships operated. The actors include naval and merchant seamen from around the Atlantic rim, Indian lascars, European and Asian convicts, and enslaved people from West Africa, the East Indies, and the Americas. The venues of maritime radicalism include vessels that ranged from the smallest canoe to the greatest three-masted ocean-going ship, as well as the docks, warehouses, waterfronts, and port cities beyond where these vessels congregated to embark and disembark people and commodities, sometimes people who were themselves considered commodities.
Events analyzed include maritime insurrections like those aboard the Amistad in 1839 and the Creole in 1841, as well as the maritime dimensions of larger upheavals, for example the American Revolution. Like mutineers, other agents of maritime radicalism could have three distinct though sometimes interrelated objectives. They could seek escape from, reform of, or revolution against ship, state, or capitalist economy. No single cultural tradition of maritime radicalism is posited; rather, we seek to understand how life and work at sea generated and transmitted radical action from below, and how seagoing passages served at times to preserve, revitalize, connect, and transform previous actions across time and vast spaces.
A G L O B A L I Z I N G W O R L D
In the second half of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century, a number of colonial empires stretched out across the globe. European powers including Spain, Portugal, France, Britain, the Dutch Republic, Denmark, and Sweden traded in tobacco and sugar from the Caribbean, spices, cotton, and tea from south and east Asia, silver from Latin America, gold and slaves from Africa. To do so they conquered colonies large and small in all these areas, everywhere trying to force the local population or imported slaves and servants to produce the commodities in demand on the international markets. They built fortifications to protect their trading posts, ports, and shipping lanes, both from each other and from unconquered local forces.
Wars between European empires were frequently fought in the colonies, and their possession and the domination of the sea routes connecting them became an increasingly important reason to wage war in the first place. The War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748), the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783), as well as the French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1802) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815) were all fought on a world scale.
From the American Revolutionary War onward a strong ideological element was infused into these international conflicts, reaching an apogee in the French Revolutionary Wars, when the French often encountered ideologically inspired supporters in the countries in which they fought. National and imperial boundary lines blurred. To give but one example from the essays that follow, after the Dutch Republic became the Batavian Republic in 1795 the French and their revolutionary Dutch Batavian allies went to war against the British and their own counter-revolutionary Dutch Orangist allies over the long-contested South African Cape Colony, pivotal gateway to the Indian Ocean, China, the Spice Islands, Australia, and the South Pacific beyond.
Colonial empires offered convenient places to stow away criminals and political opponents, and convicts were also used to expand imperial frontier zones. The Dutch East India Company locked up its political enemies far away from Indonesia on Robben Island, just off Cape Town. 13 The French deported to Guyana, its ''dry guillotine'', from 1795 onward.
14 The British sent convicts from Britain, Ireland, and the colonies to Australia, and from India to south-east Asia and the Andaman Islands. 15 As metropolitan labor markets strained under the weight of escalating demand for naval and merchant seamen, plantation workers, and infantrymen for the military defense of colonial outposts, imperial rulers used the law to generate a highly mobile, super-exploitable convict labor force to build and maintain the material infrastructure of expansion. 16 Another solution was to impress, conscript, and crimp workers for military service, afloat and ashore. 17 A third was using a rising proportion of foreign-born workers both from around the Atlantic and beyond, as did the Dutch and British East India fleets. 18 A fourth was employing slaves as sailors and soldiers on board ships. The scramble for cheap labor in fact was so intense that even slaves on board slave ships were put to work, commonly performing household tasks such as preparing food, and at times sailing the ship or fighting off enemies. 19 After Britain abolished the slave trade in 1807, it sometimes replaced ''white'' soldiers with liberated Africans from intercepted slave ships (''prize negroes''), whom naval authorities disembarked in colonies in the Caribbean or on Mauritius, where they were enlisted into the army or indentured for up to fourteen years. 20 Sailing a large ship was expensive, and mercantile and naval authorities tried to economize on the number of hands and on the wages they paid them, as well as on the space, food, and drink available to both crew and human cargo. Discipline in turn was harsh, and the experience of the lash was broadly shared below deck. While on board, the material circumstances of slaves, convicts, and sailors often differed only by degree, and indeed mutinous convicts -though rarely slaves, as far as we know -sometimes received critical help from one or more crew members. Such shared experiences must at times have extended to soldiers in port and on shore, who also suffered from harsh discipline, low pay, and bad food, and, much like their comrades afloat, often had to resort to desertion or mutiny so as to escape military service.
Knowledge of the ocean-world's political geography -its shifting zones of slavery and freedom, imperial domination, and peripheral autonomywas critical to mutineers, whether slaves, sailors, or convicts. Conquering the quarterdeck and becoming master of the ship was, after all, only the first step in a successful mutiny; after that, the ship had to be taken to a spot where the mutineers could sell it or at least get ashore safely. This meant that the mutineers either had to be able to navigate the ship themselves, or had to find someone from among the original crew willing and able to do so. During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, European mutineers had been able to continue sailing their ship as pirates, but by the mid-1720s, as the hold of the maritime empires over the seaways of the Atlantic tightened, this possibility disappeared from the northern hemisphere. 21 Elsewhere, of course, piracy was still an option, for instance in the South Pacific, which was only beginning to be integrated into Britain's carceral archipelago.
But in the late eighteenth-century Atlantic and Caribbean the option of fleeing towards autonomous zones was curtailed, and successful mutineers were forced instead to depend on a keen sense of where the authority or jurisdiction of one empire fizzled out and where that of a second one began, or, in the case of slave mutineers, where slavery still flourished and where it had been abolished already. All evidence suggests that such knowledge was available, for example, about abolitionist networks or the political and juridical circumstances which made it advisable to drop weapons and ships' papers overboard, and instead trust local authorities. We know little about the nature of the networks through which such information circulated, but it seems that they were kept up-to-date in rapid response to the constantly shifting political realities of a world consumed by war and revolution, in a world characterized by increased subaltern mobility and a rapidly expanding print culture. 22 Both authorities and mutineers depended on news about political shifts to determine how forces had changed or which rules applied. As global contacts grew, so did faster communication, even before technical innovations added speed. 23 Official news, however, did not always spread with the same speed as proletarian communication networks. And this was not necessarily to the disadvantage of mutineers. For example, the sailors in the British squadron at the Cape knew about the Nore mutiny before their superiors did. These surreptitious lines of communication meant that revolutionary movements spread globally, even when authorities were at pains to prevent it: in the case of the Nore mutiny, from British home waters outward to the Mediterranean squadron, the Cape, the fleet in the Indian Ocean, and the Hermione frigate in the Caribbean. 24 
R E V O L U T I O N AT S E A
Between the 1760s and late 1840s, revolutionary ferment broke out around the Atlantic world: erupting in multiple places, spreading inward and outward, and moving multi-directionally across Europe, the Americas, and the Caribbean. This resulted in a fundamental restructuring of states and empires. With American independence, Britain lost its North American colonies and turned subsequently to Asia. The French Revolution led to the abolition of the monarchy and the constitution of a new republic. And following the first and only successful revolution of enslaved peoples in world history came the birth of the independent nation of Haiti in 1804.
